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BERING AND BARRETT: atheism is unnatural

By: Antonio Chávez
hnc.correo @ gmail.com

Religion magazine just published (July 2010) two articles in response JL and J. Barrett Bering to another in the same number of Geertz & Markusson , around the natural of religion and the unnaturalness atheism. Very briefly, Geertz & Markusson, even to the hypothesis of the Cognitive Science of Religion (CCR) on the naturalness of it, argue that atheism is as natural as her. This is based on the census showing a prevalence of atheism in some countries Europeans.

Beginning with Barrett, he introduces us to the concepts of natural maturational and practiced natural , originally formulated by McCauley and have been in our article " COUNTERINTUITIVE MINIMUM ." The maturational natural is automatic cognitive processes mature and functionally independent flow of culture, as the capacity for language or calculus. In contrast, natural practiced " requires special cultural support or a 'cultural scaffolding' and test" as the ability to learn a new language or system Specific calculation. It is natural we can learn new languages \u200b\u200band develop formulas based on experience, but these are aspects that are not innate but acquired on the basis (yes innate) can speak or have numerical cognition, and while we may forget the new language learned, being healthy would not let to possess the ability to speak, so these acquisitions need practice and support. Regarding religion, it is natural, strongly suggests that the CCR as maturational, former certainly is a concept (eg Guthrie 1980), although referred to by the term intuitive . In defense of this article cites Barrett Kelemen (2004) " Are children" intuitive theists "" (Piaget beating and child animism): this " is equivalent to saying that theism is natural maturational, emerging childhood. " Of course, as he himself says, not everything that is defined as 'religion' is maturational (put as examples of natural practiced specific and explicit beliefs about God, the Conception of the Virgin Mary, or skin color Krishna), but " supernaturalism is relatively natural that atheism maturational . " Then

Barrett looks back on his own hypothesis, while referred to by Geertz & Markusson but apparently incorrectly interpreted (unfortunately not available the entire document), and tells us briefly that hiperdetección issues such as agency or cognition of involve just such an automatic death and prevalence therefore, that for a strictly naturalistic, even more than for an atheist, you must consume additional cognitive resources to implement the circumvention of such natural intuitive. In fact, naturalists sane " have a conflict even more difficult to solve " when it comes to all machinery empathy is triggered by the death of a loved one, that just makes us feel even their presence ( see this short essay about ). And of course, another serious problem is posed the innate creationism and teleology as a default explanation ( see our article), Kelemen has shown that extended beyond childhood into adulthood. This includes people scientifically trained or even atheist, as when Hawking asks "why is there something rather than nothing" . Barrett points out evidence that even though children can say "evolutionary explanation as the best explanation of the traits of animals are even more attractive creationism. " And although Geertz & Markusson question this evidence as contradictory and debatable, not cite evidence that contradicts the findings of Kelemen.

" could be that the findings of Kelemen fail to generalize to populations not yet tested, but given the latest, it seems that those who reject the intentional design behind the cosmos have the burden of producing explanations of why it is that the natural world design appears. "Barrett

This comment however seems rather provocative and subjective (remember he had a bitter argument with the atheist philosopher AC Grayling , although there did not identify any comments like this), while this explanation in scientific terms and objectives is precisely the world has such an appearance as a result of sensory information processing, and this in turn be explained because we are social primates and therefore necessarily represent the world as a continent of social meaning (which is nothing but what they represent the concepts of 'design', 'purpose' or explicitly 'superior intelligence', ie ' will 'or' intention '... mental contents attributed the external world). I think Guthrie, Bloom and of course the same Barrett provided a good basis for such an explanation.

Finally there is the issue of cultural explanations of religion, which can be summarized in the phrase of Barrett: " religion does not explain religion ." This also we have addressed several times, even in the very foundations the work of our blog. The recurrence of certain religious beliefs and practices in different cultures explained as being caused because people are born in religious cultures, it is clearly redundant and certainly does not explain such recurrence. As has yielded a large body of hypotheses and evidence focus on the cognition of people accomplished this task explanation, and this including the CCR " recognizes that various forms of 'scaffolding cultural' can help push or remove the anchors cognitive 'allowing the emergence of religion.

In conclusion, Barrett

The supernaturalism falls close to a natural anchor point maturational. In contrast, the conscious rejection of the supernatural spread seems to require some special cultural conditions that alter the function of natural maturational outputs of cognitive effort, or a strong cultural scaffolding to keep people away from their anchor points maturational natural. This relative unnaturalness may be one reason why some studies find a relationship between atheism and formal education and intelligence. Cognitive special resources or special institutions (such as formal educational institutions) may help in the maintenance of atheism. In fact, Geertz & Markusson seem open to this point when they write: "The habit of atheism may need more scaffolding to be acquired, and their religious counterparts may need more effort to be eliminated." In this we agree, but continued, " but still, it does not, ipso facto, that the latter is more natural than the first. "In the sense in which CCR researchers typically use the term 'natural' is, ipso facto, the latter is really more natural than the first .

***

J. Bering on his part replied that:

"The Howling discontent of God" in atheistic thought is, in fact, empirically verifiable phenomenon, largely referring to traces of supernatural thinking can often be found even in the representative systems the descreyente. The authors, however, do not consider these patterns of low-level thinking, implicit, or are totally unaware .

Then note the mistake of confusing religion with religious intuition when Geertz & Markusson say " atheism is less natural than religiosity." This is a "well-articulated game theistic or supernatural ideas culturally defined," and so one can in fact have a poor monk reached down into the category of atheist. And like Barrett (and as previously Boyer), Bering says that atheism is cognitively efforts, adding that if someone is or is not an atheist, " the truth is that this self-classification has little, if anything, to do with what actually happens inside your head . "Indeed, this is about the socio-demographic figures of the high levels of atheism in some countries say little or nothing against what the RCC has clearly shown intuitive or unconscious processes , still driving behaviors and superstitious ideas or quasi-religious people who are not explicitly religious beliefs. On the other hand " that atheism is unnatural is psychologically the same as saying it culturally anomalous 'under many political, economic and social policy is clearly atheism. Yet, this still does not tell us about the psychological processes of descreyentes that specifically associated with religious cognition. Bering

hand made itself has generated empirical evidence to illustrate: " when asked whether a man who had just died instantly in a car accident could" know that he had died ", eg many participants who did not believe in life after death responded affirmatively, apparently becoming aware of the contradiction between their beliefs and their reasoning (eg if the mind is extinguished by death, of course, have knowledge of own death is logically impossible) . " More specifically, says it has evidence atheists subjected to questions about autobiographical facts revealed teleological answers on points of change in their lives. I bring, but anecdotally, that this is even more dramatically clear with not a few atheists who believe in super-intelligent aliens, ghosts, in the zodiac, the quantum consciousness of the universe, and still have to see that the Raelians would be very well categorized as atheists, as this self-defining, in a census on atheism. It does not matter if it's' other ', the' theory of everything "or God, no matter what you call it, this is basically supernatural agency. " The important thing here is the psychological process and facilitates strong agentive identity, culture matters, but only to the extent of giving a raw intuition personality and name, "says Bering, and concludes:

This model strongly implies thinking that atheism is more a verbal muzzle of God-a conscious decision made to reject executory intuitions of one on an anonymous super-mind wrapped in our personal affairs, rather than a real cognitive exorcism.
(...) Meanwhile, "atheism" as a sociopolitical construct an increasingly popular brand of personal identity is far from the only atheistic kind of cognition, culturally inscribed, which the authors argue .

Related Topics:

• "RELIGION IS NATURAL?
• INTERVIEWED BY BRUCE HOOD PUNSET
• do we believe in controlling the world invisible agents
• Are we believers host innate or cultural?
• be agnostic Can a Science of Religion?

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NEURAL BASIS OF THEORY OF MIND

The ability to think and reason about the mental states of others (Theory of Mind) is, together with other specific human abilities such as the "Mental Time Travel (mental time travel) or ability to infer intentions in the objects according to how they move in physical space ( biological motion), a group of cognitive tools that are developed pre-programmed into the human being and where anchor cultural developments such as religion.

Rebecca Saxe, who runs a group of researchers in the Department of Cognitive Science Brain and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology , specializes in the study of Theory of Mind. Theory of Mind is a key to understanding how we may be able to automatically generate such vivid abstractions of events that are in principle inaccessible to perception: the mental states of others. Rebecca Saxe recently produced a summary that I found it quite full of developments in this field. The article is entitled Theory of Mind (Neural Basis) . In the introduction, says:

externally observable components of human actions involve only a small fraction of the information is important. Human observers are more interested in perceiving or inferring mental states - beliefs, desires and intentions - that underlie the observable exterior. If a person checks his watch Are you uncertain about when, late for an appointment, or bored by a conversation? If fire and wounded a friend in a hunting trip, he intended to seek revenge or just confused at his friend with a partridge?

The mechanism that people use to make inferences about mental states of others is known as Theory of Mind (ToM). One of the findings most outstanding recent human cognitive neuroscience is that there is a group of brain regions in the human cerebral cortex that underlie this selective and specific mechanism.

The importance of mental states for purposes of prediction of behavior is especially clear when the person performing the behavior is misinformed: that is, when the actor has a false belief. Therefore, false beliefs are strongly represented in studies of ToM. The original paradigm of false belief was designed to be used in children of preschool age. In the basic design, a child watches as a dummy place an object at location A. The doll leaves the scene and the object is transferred to location B. The doll is back and asks the child to predict where the puppet will look for the object. The three year olds answered that the doll will look in to location B, where the object actually is, the older children say that the doll will look at location A, where the doll was the object seen.

the tradition of developmental psychology many of the initial research on the neuroimaging theory of mind required that the subjects attributed false beliefs people into cartoons or caricatures. Most of these studies have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure changes in cortical oxygenation.

Throughout these studies, a very consistent set of brain regions has been implicated in the condition of "false belief" for each study, including the temporo-parietal junction left and right (JTP), medial parietal cortex (including the posterior cingulate and precuneus) and the medial prefrontal cortex (MFPC). These same brain regions have been identified by converging methodologies, including studies of Theory of Mind in states with injury and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). This group of regions brain is sometimes collectively called the "Red Tom."

A critical issue that emerged from this work is whether the ToM network is a different domain-specific neural systems and to think about the mind. The alternative is that some or all of the ToM network regions are actually recruited to some other aspect that meet the test of false belief. There is more to the fact solve the test of false belief that the very concept of false belief, and there is more to the concept of belief that stand the test of false belief. In particular, attributing a false belief to another person depends heavily on two cognitive skills that are not specific a theory of mind: language and inhibitory control. Conceivably, the ToM network activation may reflect a combination of language processing and inhibitory control. This paper reviews first then the evidence for the relationship between ToM, language, and inhibitory control in the brain, then analyzed to further research on the neural bases of ToM.

As is clear from reading the essay, what actually happens when we theorize about the mental states of others is that we generate beliefs about desires, beliefs, feelings or intentions that might motivate the behavior of others. Theory of Mind (ToM) is then a process that has more to do with the formation of concepts and not to be confused with empathy. However, quite possibly the generation of beliefs about the mental states of others is biased beliefs to detect "true", that is, one often assumes that what the other believes it is mostly true. Remember that ToM is a "guide" to try to predict the actions of others. If, however, continuously we assume most of what others believe is false or misleading the social world would become very confusing. Saxe puts it as follows:

More generally, one might expect that the ToM attributions were used for both true and false belief: in our daily lives, we must expect that other people have mostly true beliefs, or their actions would become completely unpredictable.

While empathy makes use of one's own sensory-motor systems, the "red ToM" looks like an entirely different system. Empathy is more related to those brain regions of the generation depends subjective experience of self, for example the perception of feelings. Saxe concluded that despite what might appear at first glance, does not depend on ToM of these cortical systems we use to act (motor) or feeling (sensory):

Theory of Mind and Mirror Neurons

In the area of \u200b\u200b"understanding human actions, is an intuitive distinction between actions own, and actions taken by others. The neural mechanisms required to implement their own actions toward a goal are quite specific, including sensory perception of the local environment, planning and motor control. Understanding the actions of someone else it might seem, in contrast, an achievement highly abstract, if not semimilagroso. However, recently many researchers have proposed that higher cognitive functions may be abstract sensorimotor foundations. That is, an observer can understand the actions of others using the same cognitive and neural mechanisms used to plan their own. This idea is sometimes called "motor theory of social cognition."

An advantage of the motor theory of social cognition is its parsimony. The action prediction and understanding can be achieved with the same cognitive and neural mechanisms that the viewer already uses for its own planning and execution, but does not need an extra system for ToM.

As described above, however, Recent neuroscientific evidence undermines this view. There are specific brain regions involved to attribute mental states, and these brain regions are not part of the observer's own motor system. ToM network is completely different, anatomically, of the brain regions involved in executive action or the action perception. Many neuroimaging studies have focused on activation during action redundant perceptual and executive action, the ventral premotor cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus and right inferior parietal cortex. In contrast, regions implicated in ToM have no known role in motor planning and executive control.

However, when reviewing the evidence that Saxe has theorized that some of "ToM network (the MFPC and medial parietal cortex) could be activated by other functions and thus be part of a" domain- general. " According to the author the right temporo-parietal junction, and perhaps the left is the only region (domain-specific) that seems to specialize in the generation of beliefs about the mental states of others. And is that during the activation of the ToM network come into play other cognitive skills: 1) the language, 2) inhibitory control. The generation of beliefs about the mind of others need simultaneous processing of language and cognitive inhibibitorio control, ie, there is the task of deciding between what "you know the physical environment" and that "one knows what the other thought on the physical environment." This requires the ability to inhibit one of two responses:

In general, fMRI and lesion evidence converge on three conclusions regarding the relationship between ToM and inhibitory control in the adult brain: (1) Performance successful in many kinds of tasks on the type of false belief is dependent on both a domain-general of inhibitory control and domain-specific mechanisms to represent mental states. (2) These contributions are supported by different neural mechanisms, which can be differentiated. (3) The domain-specific component of ToM depends at least in part, on the JTP.

A major open question has to do with the relative role of left and right JTP in ToM. The fMRI studies point to the right JTP, JTP while the left has been the focus of studies by injury. Future studies should use non-verbal tasks Apperly and colleagues developed by patients who have lesions in the right JTP.

Another approach to assess the extent to which the network performs functions ToM specific (generate beliefs about the beliefs of others) or general, is subject to certain tasks to individuals with acquired cortical damage (eg stroke) and is expressed with language difficulties (aphasia):

Ian Apperly and colleagues provided strong new evidence to the same scenario. PH, a young man who had a stroke left, was tested with a battery of tests for language and ToM. Although PH had great difficulty in testing syntax, specifically including embedded clauses syntax, showed no problems with non-verbal tests of ToM, including belief tasks falsas de primero y segundo orden (Lo que X piensa que Y piensa). En conjunto, estos estudios proporcionan clara evidencia, aún cuando existe discapacidad severa gramatical, que en la edad adulta las bases neurales de la toM y lenguaje son en gran parte distintas.

Así, para Saxe y colaboradores la Junción Temporo-Parietal derecha es principal candidato a ser el área específica que procesa la formación de creencias sobre los estados mentales de los demás. Incluyo un video en donde se observan descripciones gráficas y modelos anatómicos:

the end, the article raises the following conclusions and future directions in research on ToM:

In all recent studies are beginning to shed light on brain regions involved when adult humans reason about the minds other people - that is, in Theory of Mind. A surprising result in these early studies is that a particular group of complicated regions are consistently involved in the Theory of Mind, called "ToM network, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) right and left prefrontal cortex medial (MPFC) and the Medial parietal cortex (PC). These brain regions involved in the Theory of Mind are remarkably robust. These regions can be identified in 90% of individual subjects, after just 20 minutes of scanning time, the same regions have been reported in laboratories in different continents, using different procedures and different stimuli. The same group of regions have been identified as relevant to ToM injury studies and TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation). Activation patterns comparable reliability are routinely observed for perceptual mechanisms, such as sensory and motor cortices, but rarely for dimensions of cognition as abstract and complex as the Theory of Mind. The regions of the "theory of mind" thus offering a rare window into the mind brain.

Still, critical questions remain open: What are the specific roles of brain regions that make up the ToM network? How does the ToM network interact with other brain regions that underlie language, inhibitory control and perceptual action (eg mirror neuron system)? How do these brain regions develop? Are these brain mechanisms universal to all human beings? Are specifically human? There are many important research remains to be done.

is plausible that the ToM network into action even without physically being present no agent, that is, nothing prevents us to theorize about the mental states of creatures that no longer exist or exist in a remote physical space . From there it is only a small step to theorize about supernatural beings. It is then natural that no effort, as an extension of the ToM, we can reason about intentions, beliefs and desires that we assume are in the "mind of God", for example, assumptions about the degree of authoritarianism, benevolence or indifference.

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INTUITIONS WHAT? Dualism WHAT?

By: Antonio Chávez
hnc.correo @ gmail.com

Next August will take place in Canada the annual meeting (2010) of the International Association of Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR in English), within the framework of twentieth world congress of the International Association for History of Religions (IAHR). Some of the papers that I find interesting (actually all are) is that of Steven Horst * " What insights? What is dualism? "and Afzal Upal" effect the minimum counterintuitive seen based on context. " Then translate their abstracts (not yet available the full articles.) After each comment.

• Steven Horst: "What insights? What dualism? "

Proponents of Cognitive Science of Religion (CCR) argued that the dualism and belief in non-material agents are" intuitive "(Bloom, Guthrie) or" counterintuitive "(Boyer, Barrett .) However, these claims require further philosophical scrutiny only in relation to what is meant by 'dualism' 'Belief' and '(anti-) intuitive. "

Bloom's argument is based on claims of developmental psychologists on "nuclear systems of knowledge" for objects and agency, exploiting the fact that these systems are dissociable: the agent detection system can be activated without the system object is activated. (This seems consonant with the explanation pioneer Guthrie.) In fact, children can learn the additional skills of triangulation of humans and animals through the two systems. In the explanation of Bloom and Guthrie, the ability to conceive without a body agents should not be counterintuitive or cause cognitive dissonance, at least one stage early development. This is what supports the claim that we are "innate dualists." But the argument does not hold true dualistic vision (one which states that agents are distinct from the bodies), and to think without thinking agents falls short bodies to think no-body-servants, much less as "thinking substance but discontinuous "(But unextended thinking Substance ).

Boyer and Barrett suggest that agents disembodied concepts arise naturally when our typical patterns of Theory of Mind and Intuitive Biology (folk biology) come into contact with our ability to alter the parameters of these schemes to form beliefs minimally counterintuitive as' minds without bodies. " Such concepts are much closer to truly be regarded as "dualistic", though of course not contain all the elements of a formal dualistic metaphysics expressed by Descartes. They are "counterintuitive" at least in the sense established by Boyer, but you could argue that they are "intuitive" in the sense that human minds are highly biased towards train them and accept them.

real competition of these two explanations may depend on the details of the development of basic cognitive schemas as the core agency and the Theory of Mind. For example, proponents of the Core Agency (Spelke, Carey, Wynn) argue that this can be found as early in development as we can verify reliably, while the most common criterion for the theory of mind (the false belief test) is not last until the age of three years. This suggests that the Theory of Mind may emerge later, perhaps built on a more primitive core of the agency system that is shared with many other species. If this is the case, then the two arguments may actually snapshots of different stages of development: the bloom early, before the development of theory of mind or intuitive biology. In this phase, agency systems and of objects can be fully differentiated and activated separately. The theory of Boyer and Barrett may reflect a later stage of development, in which schemes for humans and animals have come to incorporate standards of objectivity and agency. At this stage, think of ghosts or gods as "people without bodies" can be considered truly counterintuitive in cognitively stimulating as Boyer suggests. ***

On the first presentation, I personally am skeptical of what they repeatedly insist philosophers as "philosophically correct" on the concepts, in this case employing Bloom, 'dualism '. In fact, if we DRAE be based on the definitive Bloom should not even mentioned that word. However, as he The Edge said in discussing the Innate Dualism " The dualism that I discuss is that the soul-which contains the memories, desires, and consciousness is immaterial, is distinct from body. This is the view of René Descartes, but it is also expressed by Plato, Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, as well as many other . "So I am not clear why dualism" right "Horst is required to be satisfied. Further, I believe it would be problematic if not unnecessary, to expect that infant cognition here is perfectly equivalent to how philosophers define adults 'dualism'. Also, I do not see how else to be called to the fact that a young child relates to "his" brain as "their" toys and even an adult, referring similarly to the "substance discontinuous" as "his "car or" his "house. The brain and / or body do seem to innately understood as something different from the emotions and desires (the "mind").

Horst's suggestion on the two cognitive stages seems likely to change quite plausible. I have suggested previously that the core of the agency is ultimately the detection of biological motion, whereas infants seen in just 48 hours old. It does not seem possible to go backwards in human child development to identify other nuclear based mechanism, in addition this has been identified in other animals. It seems, in effect, that there is a biological motion sequence → ToM → agency that actually determines or skewed to human cognition to intuit the contents inadvertently mental "especially emotional, as something different, not cognitive dissonance in infants and when they sensed identically, at least viewed as something Special as adults, with or without cognitive dissonance. The concept of mind-disembodied is intuitive enough agreeing to Guthrie, but be that as explicit attributes telepathy, telekinesis or transcendence in time / space, which is nothing but the "soul" in religious terms, are products development of more sophisticated cognitive abilities and later in child development, not only thanks to the Theory of Mind. Very interesting and timely here is what Bloom said in The Edge " the question of the immaterial soul concerns the future, your future and the future of your loved ones '.

Indeed, the "soul" as a religious concept is not possible without some sense of the future (not present in infants up to 2-4 years) without being able to visualize scenes and imaginary situations in which we represent the dead agent ( this even still after 6-7 years of age). This concept "soul", its easy learning and cultural acceptance is possible not only because our own cognition tends to fix violations in the memory of what we expect on the behavior of agents (eg the narrative of a "mind "going through walls at will or moving objects without physical body captures the attention and memory) it's about what this next paper, but additionally but decisively, because we have Mental Time Travel (MTT) (and therefore also have suggested, according to Tulving , counterintuitive that it is possible due to its ability of representational transespaciotemporalidad agent, who is short, a recombination of emotions, memories, planning, and abstraction).

Afzal Upal • "The effect of minimum counterintuitive seen from the context"

The finding that minimally counterintuitive concepts are remembered better than the intuitive and maximally counterintuitive that has been important for many cognitive scientists of religion, who have used it to explain the pervasiveness of the concepts minimally counterintuitive in religious beliefs throughout the world. Attempts to account for the benefits of minimally memorability of counterintuitive concepts can be divided into two classes. The first approach advocated in (J. Barrett & Nyhof 2001, Boyer 1994, Boyer & Ramble 2001) and most clearly articulated by Barrett (JL Barrett 2008) only emphasizes the psychological aspects of minimally counterintuitive concepts and is expressed in terms of a modular view of mind. The second approach presented in (Upal 2005; Upal, Gonce, Tweney & Slone 2007) is minimally counterintuitive concepts and ideas that violate people's expectations and emphasizes the role of the context to make them memorable. While the second approach emphasizes the role played by the context, I refer to as the contextual approach and the first approach and the conceptual. Both are similar in many ways. Both are under the general epidemiology of beliefs developed by (Sperber 1996) that focuses on exploring the competition between ideas to understand why certain representations may spread and become cultural. Both approaches also assume that the best evocation minimally counterintuitive concepts is the product of evolutionary processes that result in people having a memory architecture that causes minimally counterintuitive concepts are remembered better than other types of concepts. Both approaches also share the goal of developing a cognitive model of learning and memory in humans concepts, aimed at processing information, which can account for the counterintuitive effect of the minimum. I will develop the two approaches noting the many similarities and differences between them and discuss a range of influence of experimental studies on these issues. ***

This issue has been addressed previously translating an entire article about it. Indeed, there is mention of the distinction made by philosopher McCauley:

"between natural cognition of maturity (ie, the natural product of human growth - early developed, highly automatic and fluent, and low cultural variation) and cognition practiced natural (also automatic and fluent, but it requires special devices and explicit instruction, and high intra-and inter-cultural variation). Intuitive cognition is invariably the first type. "

Accordingly, the counter-part the second kind, and as is evident, involves the influence of context. But I think the counter-cultural and spread covers two aspects: modularity both cognitive and environmental influences. And I think the identity of the two aspects is formed by the MTT. That is, minimally counterintuitive concepts may be as intuitive as the cognitive architecture itself, just the MTT, has a default extra-ordinary nature . Going back to what said above, eg single evocation of memories, something unseen but active at all times, means reversing the arrow of time in reference to the view of time in scientific terms. Make plans for tomorrow, past or in the next 10 years obviously means jumping in time, whether or not that was actually made our plans when the real time comes. If we are to characterize the supernatural beings as counterintuitive, counterfactual or directly as opposed to scientifically guided experience, eg contrary to natural law (as the arrow of time), then these terms can be characterized to own human cognition, by default, as opposed to that experience.

is that, as I said elsewhere: more surprising than the fact that the earth appears flat in spite of astronomy and geometry (the same way that simply do not perceive especiotemporal curvature, but it is provable), is the fact that we can form beliefs about mental content actually inaccessible to someone, or the sudden death of a loved one triggers the feeling of grief over what is nothing but a corpse incapable to perceive our empathy. More complex than simply not able to perceive something but can prove exists outside our heads, is that although we prove (scientifically) that a family has no real presence or mind can no longer such cognitive-emotional mechanisms are triggered or yes, and this would say that largely out of cognitive dissonance. From a scientific perspective this is counterfactual and yet this is the default operation of our cognition. Clear is that in principle, she does not know the scientific or philosophically "correct" but that is adaptive and probabilistic, although, paradoxically, allow the actual construction of scientific methodology. The idea then is that it is an issue strongly dependent on the context that both counter-cultural prosperity and scientific objectivism, since neither is the same as the 'reflex sympathetic' to the dead that the concept of Chi, the same way that knowledge science is progressive and cumulative. In an initial state of psychological development, an agent with whom you have an involvement empathy is understood as having feelings even though dead, and this without causing any discomfort or cognitive dissonance, while in an adult the accumulated scientific knowledge acquisition may involve a real cognitive effort of having to be consciously modulating the teleological intuitions by example.

counterintuitive We saw that the 'strict' Boyer & Barrett (ideas that contradict the concepts / expectations innate) could belong to a later stage of cognitive development, I point it as dependent on the appearance of MTT, already seen as intrinsically counterfactual . Therefore, the contextual approach counterintuitive fact by Upsal also be possible only with this capability, while such an approach is made to interact with external stimulants contraintuición (eg acquisition of beliefs that allow to form new potentially counterintuitive metarepresentational degrees).

certainly and finally, it remains intriguing that attention and memory focus on the content counterintuitive an idea or a story, which is what ultimately causes his success and cultural persistence, generation after generation. Intriguing because in the end, this effect is a natural consequence of how our cognition operates, therefore, everything defined as counterintuitive is certainly intuitive. At least, those definitions seem to now be useful to the cognitive study of religion, but may be purely illusory.

(*) the time was available in the English abstract is here fully translated. Now I could only locate a shorter version yet.

Related Topics:

• MINIMUM COUNTERINTUITIVE
• ANIMISM, FOLK BIOLOGY AND BIOLOGICAL DISPOSITION OF MOTION
• THE COUNTERINTUITIVE (INTUITIVE) AND THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION
• "RELIGION IS NATURAL?
• MENTAL JOURNEY IN TIME ('MENTAL TIME TRAVEL') AND RELIGIOUS COGNITION
• Mental Time Travel, Agency, and the origin of religion