Wednesday, June 23, 2010

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CHIMPANZEE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE "LIKE DEATH?

By: Antonio Chávez
hnc.correo @ gmail.com

The anthropologist Stewart Guthrie , prominent author of the cognitive theory of religion as a hyper-extension agents, mentioned in the book Current Approaches in the cognitive science of religion (Pyysiäinen & Anttonen 2002, pp. 42, 45 ) a "rain dance" between chimps, enlightening and with special behaviors of the animals as if they were to actually intentional agents not present (because behaviors are not uncommon, as in other such predator cautious yet visible), the hyper-agent is a cognitive mechanism default widespread in the animal world. A classic example, although anecdotal fact, he gave himself in his book Darwin Origin man (where in fact this approach goes back to religion) about your dog barking at random movements of an umbrella due to wind, as if to " the presence of someone who produjese." As well, the man can see a face in what they are but stains on the Moon, hearing voices in the wind or reflection mode intentionality intuition after an event purely random. Animism and anthropomorphism of human beings are simply aspects of the mechanism of agency. According to Guthrie and Darwin, this is because the cognitive platform that enables religion.

chimpanzees now surprise us again, this time with certain behaviors Social concerning the death of a partner who could remember our own behavior in similar circumstances. The BBC News published late last April a newspaper article which reports on two events, both recorded on video (see below). The relevant reports have been published in Current Biology (the abstract: Anderson et al . 2010 ; Biro et al . 2010). The first in a zoo in Scotland, with several chimpanzees show clear empathic behavior toward a female group that is dying. None of this surprises while previously shown that chimpanzees are empathetic. New, not seen before, is that before the death of a partner. According to the report including the adult daughter of the dead female was with her all night. The second is part of a study of individuals in the wild, showing a similar behavior of two mothers on their children dead. One of the females even load the body of her son on her back. The care of the dying or the dead is a common behavior here, which is surprising.














In both cases, observers believe that chimpanzees experience the death of someone close the same way as humans, " although chimps do not have religious beliefs or rituals surrounding the death. " At least according to the second case, the comments " confirm the existence of a powerful bond between mothers and offspring, which may persist, amazingly, even after the baby's death ." So does transcend death issues such as empathy, bonding (bonding ) or attachment ( attachment)? (Assuming that both humans and chimpanzees all these structured care behaviors, eg on sick individuals.) In humans it's undeniable that together and this regardless of religious beliefs, but it now seems clear that chimpanzees also manifest. How is it possible? In principle we can avoid the problem of explaining if you believe or not chimpanzees in 'spirits' or 'souls' because in fact it would not be necessary to continue having feelings (sympathetic, of bonding, altruistic) during the illness, the agony or after the death of someone close. And this regardless of whether such behaviors are hormonally regulated, associated with reproductive cycles (at which mothers would still hang on to their offspring, although dead). The intriguing biological regulations are not associated or even that it is a cultural learning among chimpanzees (since there is evidence indicating this), but neurocognitive aspects that structure these behaviors and their relationship with these same behaviors in humans.

In " The mental time travel ('mental time travel') and religious cognition 'and' Mental Time Travel , agency, and the origin of religion " suggest precisely the concept 'spirit' is a combination of Mental Time Travel and empathy. Such a combination would explain the cognition of human death and its extension in religious concepts, such as due to a cognitive mechanism 'by default' (which Paul Bloom called innate dualism), which permits one to understand the mind as an independent entity physical body, especially in regard to mental contents as emotions and desires, then still "work" despite the death. In parallel, as seen in infants under 4 years of age and not before, it seems that empathic involvement with an agent that activates this intuitiveness dies suddenly, or at least they are associated. In the ingenious I think paradigmatic experiment, designed by Bering & Bjorklund (2004) in a fictional scene with puppets a 'baby mouse' is described to children of various ages as having a bad day, being lost with no idea of \u200b\u200bwhere or how to get home, with sleep and hunger. Suddenly, he is consumed by a 'crocodile' and told the children that the mouse is no longer alive. In fact, a few infants replied that the mouse is still alive, but were persuaded that he is dead. Then asked a series of questions and responses of children on the mouse eg if you still want to go home or if still loves his mother, were prominently affirmative were much younger infants.

I subscribe to Bloom's comment that this is "the most dramatic demonstration dualism child." But while this may explain the cognition of human death and obviously the basis of the concepts of 'spirit' or 'soul', it is also clear that these beliefs we can not identify in chimpanzees. And not just because of the fact that our current understanding of their cognition is precarious, but since they do not overcome the first-order representation of intentionality ( I know that John wants tal cosa ), mientras los humanos somos capaces de un cuarto o quinto orden ( yo sé que Juan quiere que María entienda que Pedro cree que Isabel lo ama ), no parece que fueran capaces de tales ideaciones. En todo caso, aquellos conceptos (espíritu, alma) son inadecuados para explicar estas conductas vistas en chimpancés debido que a pesar de todo, sigue siendo evidente que ellos parecen concebir el cadáver como todavía un agente, por lo menos, carente de cuidados. Es posible que, como en el caso del «animismo animal» de Guthrie, cual atribución de animación en último término, la empatía, en tanto que filogenéticamente antigua, podría ser también un ‘reflejo’ not necessarily turned to animated objects.

This may be the best indication of the high complexity of chimpanzee social behavior. And while the primate evolutionary line reaches the hypersocial human condition, it seems that chimpanzees are already firmly on the road and "at least have precursors representational skills" (Ellis & Bjorklund 2005 p. 59). However, human social behavior has hypertrophic character (eg " intuitive set of principles inferring mental states, perceptions, beliefs and desires-from the observed behavior is incomparably more complex than in any other species " Boyer 2000) as to interact with the outside world (eg exercise control over him) is a necessary precondition imbue attributes of causality, functionality and intentionality (ie: teleology, anthropomorphism, magical thinking, superstition), and that over that thinking people interact both with simple and real as inanimate objects, mere accidental circumstances or simply random events. With all this, the agency of death is as natural and intuitive as language and arithmetic, and according to two studies on the share with chimpanzees. But, again, is not simple case, since we as humans are inconceivable neurocognitive abilities in chimpanzees and in fact related to the agency of death (eg, Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). This matter will have to review very briefly the neurocognitive similarities between humans and chimpanzees and then the differences. as seen in the article on the MTT and assumptions discussed in advance of anthropologists Maurice Bloch and Barbara King (on how to approach or move away from cognitive neuroscience of imagination, self-projection or MTT), is temporomedial shown that the region (eg hippocampus) is similar in humans and chimpanzees and that both species use the same brain regions (frontomedial / parietomedial) to retrieve episodic memory and even to exercise self-projection. Additionally, the neural basis of the agency are also similar.

these aspects are likely to hold enough neurocognitive empathy for a dead relative or partner group. This would be easy to explain this behavior through cultural learning (such as mnemonic processing), but does not resolve the question of its origin. However, in another region such as human frontopolar (Brodmann area 10) is crucial for episodic memory processing and self-projection in a school, the MTT, that chimpanzees could not have it because they have that area 6 times smaller. This is compounded by the high complexity of this area citoarquitectónica most other directly associated (anterior cingulate, unique brain region rich in spindle neurons) both episodic memory areas used to assess probabilities, making quite sophisticated reaction to contingencies , allowing the construction plans and represent possible scenarios (eg future tense) in which to run. This cognitive ability, obviously neuroevolution possible by those two regions, can not possess the chimpanzees. An obvious consequence is that humans then experience the death of someone close sympathetically differently to chimpanzees.

At least according to these neurocognitive comparisons between the two species, the difference would be the degree of meta-representation, association (ie with memory) and conceptualization (eg narrative logic) involved in the conduct sympathetic to the death of someone close.

leave for another video reflection on some aspects of social behavior in nonhuman primates related to human moral behavior.







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