may be misleading to speak of "moral values" as the concept tends to put us on the idiosyncrasies of each culture ethics: the rationale, judgments and explicit criteria based on which virtue and sin. Without considering that morality is transformed over time. These changes have sometimes been called "the moral spirit of the times" (The Moral Zeitgeist). Known examples are the abolition of slavery, racial equality, equality of women, acceptance of homosexuality as a normal variant of the conduct, the decriminalization of abortion or gay rights to adoption.
cultural diversity moral schema is such that some experts on the subject declare that the only sane is to take a "moral pluralism" as a more convenient position for science. However, even the moral agnosticism that permeates the work of science is no stranger to the bias imposed by goals that are implicit. For example, the medicine would have no meaning if it were left to concede that prolongation of life is a desirable value. What could be then goals guidelines Scientific Study of Morality ? If we define "value" as that which is good for human nature What would be the practical applications of this novel area of \u200b\u200bscience? Will one day the Science of Morality design strategies to foster values \u200b\u200bthat are desirable? How, within the cultural plurality, to define values \u200b\u200bthat are universally desirable ?
A first obstacle is that in general the cognitive sciences are still far from being representative of the cultural plurality. In "The World's Strangest People (The weirdest People in the World? ) Joseph Henrich discusses this issue. Where "Weird" is both used as a contraction for the characteristics of populations usually are investigated and where the data are extrapolated: W estern, E Ducat, I ndustrialized, R ich, and D emocratic. Joseph Henrich's review suggests that we should be cautious in generalizing conclusions based on unusual samples of the population and who today are not representative of cultural diversity, can lead to misguided concepts of the human natualeza.
moral transformation in history, the Zeitgeist, not a process of endless possibilities. So I think the best metaphor will not be, as suggested by Jonathan Haidt-compare " moral intuitions "with the sense of taste, the only thing it shows is the suggestion that the target must be ethical you choose configurations of moral values \u200b\u200bthat are pleasing to the senses. , If were so, the "desirable" in the moral values \u200b\u200bshould be sought in its potential to generate pleasant emotional states, whether of pleasure, comfort or happiness. This was the argument Haidt ; in for questions and answers from Sam Harris series of conferences organized by the foundation Edge, namely that having proved that the Christian Evangelists United States America are one of the groups "most happy" this means that regardless of the veracity of the beliefs that hold moral rules they have adopted are successful. In my opinion, the above is wrongly focused. A better analogy that "metaphor gustatory sensory of Haidt would be the" metaphor nutrition. The variety of diets and whistles does not change the fact that regardless of how nice it is to the taste, there are some more or less nutritional value. Likewise, individual happiness can not be the only criterion to guide us to choose between good and bad moral schemes.
I think both Paul Bloom and Marc Hauser gives us, without intending it, a pattern when commenting on his study of the empathic response. Bloom in early psychological development of children, Hauser in the analysis of empathic deficit in psychopaths. If we add a second dimension, that of moral disgust or anger, we have two emotional experiences that shape what David A. Pizarro, Brian Detweiler-Bedell and Paul Bloom called the "Moral Circle "
No one feels guilty of kicking a stone for the mere pleasure of it, but doing the same thing to a child is universally banned. What is the difference? Somewhere between the rocks and children, moral codes across all cultures draw a limit - there is what the philosopher Peter Singer has been characterized as a "moral circle" distinguishing things that are worthy of our moral concerns those that are not.
These differences are necessary for the implementation of rules moral. Specifies, for example, who and what counts as "other" in the rule of not harming the innocent.Thus, the gradual expansion of the "moral circle" is usually behind the changing Zeigeist Moral, where the cultures morally more advanced tend to extend empathy to increasing dominance. A "healthy" moral circle is both an important element in individual happiness, the personal development and cultural, and even, as suggested by Bloom, to safeguard the planet. However, the empathy is "distorted" by its counterpart: the disgust or moral disgust, a response of revulsion or rejection. In this same article says about that:
Although the expansion of the moral circle could drive along time to a more inclusive world, altruistic, a quick look to the past century shows the extent of human cruelty and the ease with which individuals draw boundaries which exclude the "other" moral care.
Among other things, disgust is often experienced as a reaction to members of social groups is not desirable and people who come into contact with members of these groups. Due to its presence universal and easily it can be induced in the other, the dislocation can be a powerful force for social dialogue, and has played a profound role in shaping culture.
Therefore, the dislocation has the potential to shape the moral circle since it induces instinctive judgments and encourages the avoidance of social objects. This makes the disgust a practical tool to persuade others that certain individuals and groups are not worthy of moral concern. Indeed, as we shall see, a tactic most powerful to generate contempt for members of outside groups is labeled as creatures dirty and vile. This strategy was evident in the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, and the modern, anti-gay rhetoric has appealed to the vileness of their sexual practices.So what can be assigned to disgust some kind of moral role, asks that Arleen LF Salles makes in the essay entitled About Loathing in Morality:
From an evolutionary perspective, disgust is focused on the rejection food and taste. As omnivores, humans have flexibility regarding what to consume, but also therefore at risk of consuming contaminants. Against this, the disgust is presented as a survival mechanism, is a strong primitive and automatic response in rejecting that which can damage or infect.
The so-called "moralized disgust" is caused by socio-moral offenses and transgressions .. For Rozin, Haidt and colleagues, despite the disgust began as a defense mechanism of the body and originally caused the pollutant specific animals, has been transformed and can be caused by elements unrelated to the organic and animal, for example, notions abstract as a violation of moral rules.
Sea caused by abstract notions about the violation of rights, is the product of carnal specific triggers, disgust seems to function as an important means to internalize moral prohibitions.
But the question is: should we conclude, therefore, that there is a moral transgression against which disgust is the appropriate reaction?
these cases may not be too frequent, but certainly there are actions that are morally abhorrent acts of extreme injustice and cruelty intentional (Glover 2002). In these cases, disgust emotion does not seem inappropriate in the sense that "fits the evidence."I think that to decide whether disgust is an appropriate emotion would be necessary to contextualize it, and I mean the fact of whether or not an appropriate response to cultural beliefs local. The acts mentioned Salles, where the disgust seems to be justified, are in fact conduct in violation of the empathic response. In other words, the disgust is inadequate when inhibited or cancel an empathic reaction is desirable. And in the end we are left with an interplay of emotional responses of moral intuitions so different from the traditional discourse ethics rationale.
Finally, I note that the above could be enriched if it included , the contributions of neuroscience. Both empathy as disgust / dislike, like all other neurobiological capacity can be distributed along graded dimensions, surely there is great variability in the brain's ability to generate and experience each of these emotional states. Although are well known deficiencies in the reaction of empathy (psychopathy, narcissism, autism, etc..), there is less research on the neural correlates of the reaction of disgust. However, there are already some studies analyzing, for example, hypersensitivity reaction of disgust in individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder who dominates the fear of contamination. RE Brady et al.concluyen that:
This article reviews the existing literature for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (type pollutants) with emphasis on the role of disgust in the etiology and maintenance of this variant of DOC. We propose an updated model for the DOC-based pollution which corresponds to elevated levels of disgust response observed in individuals with this form of DOC.Taking as its starting point the known neural correlates of these "insights moral "(eg empathy and Prefrontal Cortex Ventromedial / Previous Disgust and the insula cortex) we could, I guess, even plotted along coordinate intersecting dimensions of empathy and anger / disgust. And in the possible combinations and rankings of the four quadrants resulting distribution, for example, individuals conservatives, subjects with obsessive tendencies (perhaps some with high nivles of anger and low levels of empathy), liberal or persons within the autism spectrum and psychotic. Arleen LF Salles
concluded by emphasizing the importance of seeking new ways to shed light on the nature of these complex emotions:
If you want to advance the debate, we must rid ourselves of sacralization or conservative conception of repulsion, we must go beyond the idea that disgust is only a legitimate emotional reaction within a conservative morality. The issue that perhaps we should discuss more carefully if not disgust is an emotion of rejection, because obviously it is-but how such rejection may play a role in a morality based on the basic elements considered essential thinkers like Nussbaum.
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