By: Antonio Chávez
hnc.correo @ gmail.com
think this is an issue downplayed or even "taboo" in circles irreligious. If you think that religious beliefs are mere "irrationality" or even "mind viruses (memes )" that "infect" and "hijack" the minds of people (Dawkins 2006 p. 188), I doubt that with such budget estimate is to be some positive value of religion, not referring to this as a purely superficial or purely speculative (just in case "pro-religious"), but a deep and sophisticated that it can benefit the mind and body which can be demonstrated scientifically. In this case, the psychology and social neuroscience further we draw a more complex landscape in which it appears that the answer to the question: Is religion a tranquilizer? is positive. Try to discuss this. Meanwhile, data from these disciplines enrich the cognitive science of religion, but do not fit very well into the "standard model" of Pascal Boyer ( cf. Pyysiäinen 2009 p. 186). Namely, that religion per se is an anxiolytic may be in support of a theory adaptationist of religion, the alternative model to Boyer because he does not see religion as a byproduct neurocognitive , but proposes that it is directly adaptive (necessarily making use of a so-called 'selection group '), because it would be a device socioemotional cohesion within groups (eg Alcorta & Sosis 2005 ).
Michael Inzlicht is assistant professor of psychology and head of Laboratory of Social Neuroscience of the University of Toronto. Recognized for his studies in self-regulation in this line of research approaches to neuroscience, in particular studying the anterior cingulate (CCA) and its fundamental role as a modulator cognitive / emotional in the process of self-regulation. Thus, very recently about the reaction to the uncertainties, the degree of religious conviction and its relationship with anxiety as part of that process. Two studies reported in Psychological Science ( Inzlicht et al. 2009 ; Inzlicht & Tullett 2010) report that the degree of religious conviction is inversely related to activation of the CCA. The 2009 study was briefly mentioned in " The mental journey in time ('mental time travel') and cognition religious " as part of the analysis of the CCA and its role in human evolution and religion. The recently published (of which only have the abstract) confirms " the power of religion to act as a shock [buffer] against anxiety reactions "which naturally produce the uncertainty or denial, that is, the activation of 'error detection' of the brain ( CCA , though, see the references of studies discussed this concept) to address such contingencies. Indeed, here a good object of study is religious beliefs, and cling defensively to them due to the uncertainty or disappointment predictably involves the CCA, as indeed we saw earlier in a study of Harris et al . (2007) where the denial of religious belief (as opposed to his claim and having a degree of conviction about it) and the uncertainty correlated with increased activity of this region.
Inzlicht et al . (2009) showed a number of participants colors and their corresponding names so right and wrong, to which should respond indicating if the correspondence were true or false. The experiment was applied to two groups: one group of religious fanatics, and a simple believers in God, including atheists. It calls our attention, but predicted that the low activity of the CCA to be more significant errors in the more fans are believers, while nonbelievers CCA activity increased, ie, they were notorious reflection anxiogenic on error. The authors suggested that this occurs " because religious beliefs provide meaning systems which give order to the world by providing guidelines for action, while also promoting a type of thinking that forces beliefs and perception away from discrepancies or erroneous predictions "(Inzlicht et al. 2009 p. 2). Similar to the anti-anxiety drugs, religion would be a " xanax " to provide a credit scheme of meaning and purpose (and design) in the world, necessarily including volitional causal agent (I add that certain "friendly" and "loving" eg God, because this will further strengthen the anxiolytic nature of religious belief as a positive emotional and empathetic). Such a scheme appears to modulate the "error detector" so that even in trivial matters, such as recognizing the wrong color name, the anxious response is reduced. In matters more profound this scheme is particularly comforting to the existential uncertainty about the future or to the social chaos, and likewise their incorporation into the brain structure of a cognitive bias that works by suppressing or not perceiving inconsistencies or discrepancies on this question scheme (ibid .) Agreeing
with what was said by Inzlicht in an interview ( NewScientist 2009), can then naturally some brains are more likely than others to seek religious beliefs and implement their schemes and cognitive / emotional (note clear that this does not mean 'religion' per se is innate). Thus, so far it seems that only people from more religious, existential dilemmas better drawing lots, they could only reduce the stress involved. However, because the brain itself seeks to minimize the perceived error and has certain predispositions, that religious beliefs can be anxiolytic. 1 We also know that social interaction is a physiological stimulant / emotional, which suggests that the mere fact of sharing beliefs can multiply the sedative effect. In short, this effect can not really limited to religious beliefs, or belong exclusively to these, but should work with any kind of beliefs or behaviors (Inzlicht et al. 2009 p. 7) to which one clings in that, primarily, we provide sense of control. In fact, it has been shown that the conservative political affiliation also attenuates the activity of the CCA ( ibid.) Adding Inzlicht in NewScientist , something similar would happen with the fans devoted to a sports team. Thus, it appears that a high conviction, in general, not just religious, is anxiolytic.
Although for Inzlicht, closing note NewScientist , religion offers something which does not sport or politics, " the ultimate explanation (...) what happens when we die ', seems rather, that this "plus" is not in itself a rarity although remarkable and impossible to underestimate (more in line with the conclusions of the article Psychological Science in contrast to this comment of NewScientist). However, the agency of death looks like another cognitive system that channels need to control, or appearance thereof, that has our social brain, the same as, remember, is constantly "projected" into the future making plans . Consequently, we need a more bug detection system developed (see " The mental time travel ('mental time travel') and religious cognition " how the CCA may have played a role in human evolution) . Now it is true that death is hardly conceivable that the brain is unable to conceive of non-agency it is therefore likely to conceive a transcendence post life, but it comes naturally and not by cultural acquisition brain conceptualizes the mind, at least their emotional and volitional, as independent (his) body and its activity or inactivity ( Bloom 2007 ). This seems a default cognitive and not something that belongs exclusively to the religion in the sense that such cognition is caused by it, at least in an evolutionary sense (ie, if it is true that religion operates culturally agency death, there seems to be its remote source.) In any case it is the reverse: the agency of death facilitates learning and cultural openness of religious thought, is one of the leading channels, along with the others mentioned. As
studies showing the association between meditation (religious: eg yoga and repetition of prayers, and not religious) and the relaxation response (as opposed to stress and anxiety) to levels of influence on gene expression on cellular metabolism associated with stress ( Dusek et al . 2008), one can effectively achieve the same physiological and psychological benefits " with prayer, repeating concentrate 'a Hail Mary ', that with repeated exercise yoga or words like 'peace' or 'love' "(Benson World 2008). If the anxiolytic effect is certainly modulated by a multitude of credit and behavioral patterns "extreme", then any of these would have greater anxiolytic easy as it seems in terms of religious conviction, could be a purely accidental. And this, rather than support an adaptationist view of religion, would be consistent with that is a byproduct of evolution. However, we must give credit to what was said by Inzlicht about what is special about religion, while, as noted, has components Neurocognitive that more directly, explicit, or more dramatic than in other systems of thought / behavior focuses on and the cop / purpose of the world, and death (in contrast to the agents certainly realistic as in the case of political affiliations and political figures or in the case of following a sports team). Thus, " the direction of causality remains to be determined: religious conviction dampens the response of CEC to error and uncertainty? or, alternatively, is the low activity in the CCA (and cognitive style associated) that inclines people toward religious belief? "(Inzlicht et al. 2009 p. 7).
I think the second option is more valid from the point of view "(pre) historic" and biological-that is, the CCA is a very old region of the brain whose functions have been extended to social-emotional aspect of behavioral regulation and seems that their nature as error detector goes back to the growth of human groups to be plausible hypothesis that the increasing complication of the interaction between individuals and the consequent need for a more accurate prediction of the behavior of conspecifics ( or a Theory of Mind more sophisticated) are directly associated with the neuroevolution of CCA. Whatever the causes biological / cultural that gave rise to religion, it seems that causally induced CEC tuning error detector. But neither can exclude the possibility that religion is a cultural product that interacted and co-evolved with the CCC in favor of counting the other components of religion that result in the conviction of certain inferences intuitive (agents, teleological, etc. ., involving other brain regions), thus becoming a "device" anxiolytic.
will have to discuss that, at least as indicated by Inzlicht and data can be inferred from other studies mentioned, although the iron belief (religious and otherwise) can benefit the mind and behavior, this does not mean that bigotry is something to be cultivated. Speculatively but not without basis, it can be assumed that as an evolutionary psychiatry is now beginning to see schizophrenia as a behavior that was adaptive evolutionary past one or as a byproduct evolutionary disadvantage, " a secondary consequence of the feature selection human cognitive "and hence the prevalence genetics ( Crespi et al . 2007 ; Crow 2000 ; Polimeni 2003 ), fanaticism also be, and what we see today are but" remains " behavior that arise when applying a number of enabling factors. If in fact an argument can be made adaptationist of religion, focusing on demonstrable adaptive value of behaviors associated with being individual / group, it seems that she was more "adaptive" than politics.
However, more studies of religious beliefs in the case of agents are explicitly terrifying supernatural and how this is associated with ansiogénesis, enough to know that human sacrifice to the gods is quite widespread. This refers to religion " generates so much anxiety and relieves: vengeful ghosts, spirits offensive and aggressive gods are as common as protective deities "(Boyer 2003 p. 120 Table 1). On the other hand, the religious initiation rituals, extended also seem little anxiety, if not also strongly anxiogenic, even up to the Buddhist monks (Atran & Norenzayan 2004 p. 714). And while he said above that God (Christianity) is "friendly" and "love" is also an agent punishing and often extremely severe, in addition to being directly involved in " the problem of evil." A different factor anxiolytic nature of religion is that she is associated with anxiogenic processes, and that both states are reflections of the same system ambivalent. This is plausible neuroanatomical while the CCA, ventrally, connects to the amygdala and the hypothalamus, which are important, respectively, in anxiety (Rosen & Schulkin 1998 ; Tottenham & Sheridan 2010) and stress ( Bao et al. 2008 , also involving the amygdala Tsige & Chrousos 2002).
Returning to the original question, the religion would not be in itself an anxiolytic, but also certain cognitive components that can be identified in other systems of thought and behavior. But she may have a sedative effect deeper by trying to "existential stressors', ie death.
Note:
↑ 1. Shall call such predispositions 'cognitive channels religion', because they facilitate the acquisition (not used solely for this purpose), plus ' spectrum agentive-naturalistic' because it inherently involves a constant allocation of mentality even inanimate objects agents, mental time travel , teleologism (Causation), dualism, an agency of death, clinging to the contraintuición. Eg " stress reduces the sense of control of people and to get it back, engaged in the search for causal " ( Keinan & Sivan 2001 ). And picking up as outlined in the article on mental time travel , here also serve Examples of these cognitive components (eg agents and teleologism) involved in religion and related to the need for control ( cf . Psychology Today 2008). So, adding in this article that the Core of such components, the allocation of agency (Eg Horst 2010), implies a decisive sense of control and that " feelings of frustration are the result of a perceived lack of control " ( Barrett & Johnson 2003), and both lack of control / frustration are stressors (cf . Almeida et al . 2002) or may even be seen as a type of stress (Weiten et al. 2008 p. 75), as these examples as we pareidolia , illusory correlations and perception of conspiracies in situations of lack of control ( Whitson & Galinsky 2008), the increase of magical thinking, superstition and causality under conditions of stress (Keinan 2002 ; 2005 - being shown even superstition improves motor and cognitive performance : Damisch 2008 ; Damisch et al. 2010 ) and see natural disasters as manifestations of intent (Bering & Parker 2006 pp. 253-254).
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